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ABSTRACT
Under the reasoning in United States v. Martingon, declaring the federal bootlegging statute
unconstitutional, databases, as "non-writings," could not be protected under Congress's copyright
power or commerce power. In other words, Congress's power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
serves to limit its ability to act under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. Martignons rationale raises
questions about a variety of prospective and existing legislation that protects "non-writings" for an
unlimited time, such as the trademark dilution statute. This article examines the merits of this
contention, arguing that the manner in which the Supreme Court has handled overlapping Article I
powers in the past, the history of the Copyright Clause, and the structure of the Constitution
suggests that the decision in Ma±rtignonis not only wrong, but breathtakingly so. In the long term,
resolution of the issues presented in this decision will set the parameters of Congress's power to
regulate not only bootlegging, but also databases and other "unoriginal" intangible property.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent sessions of Congress, the issue of whether and how to protect
databases' seems to rise from its deathbed, only to return to a persistent vegetative
state. Although the legislation remains moribund, the push for this legislation
generated a fierce debate over Congress's power to enact database protection-an
argument that resulted in the Southern District of New York invalidating a federal
2
statute barring the unauthorized recording of live musical performances.
The database proposals, and the constitutional debates which arose around
them, find their impetus in the Supreme Court's 1991 Feist decision, 3 which
contained both a practical and a constitutional dimension. Feist rejected the socalled "sweat of the brow" doctrine, under which some federal courts of appeal
afforded copyright protection to the creators of large aggregations of factual
information based on the effort to compile those collections. 4 Other courts of appeal
adopted a more "Romantic" view of copyright, 5 construing the protection granted by

* Member, Meyer Klipper & Mohr, PLLC. I have represented database producers advocating
legislation before Congress and the courts. This topic was first presented as a speech at the 2005
meeting of the American Bar Association's Intellectual Property Section. I wish to thank Mike
Klipper and Antonio Perez for their helpful criticisms. The views contained herein are entirely mine
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Meyer, Klipper & Mohr, PLLC or any of its clients. Any
remaining flaws flow from the sweat of my own brow.
1 For purposes of this discussion, the definition of a database might be helpful. For example, a
recent congressional bill defined a database as "a collection of a large number of discrete items of
information produced for the purpose of bringing such discrete items of information together in one
place or through one source so that persons may access them." Database and Collections of
Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. § 2(5)(A) (1st Sess. 2003).
2 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (invalidating 18
U.S.C. § 2319A (2000) (barring bootlegging, i.e., the "[u]nauthorized fixation of and trafficking in
sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances")); see also Kiss Catalog v. Passport
Int'l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (relying on Martignon to invalidate 17 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (2000)), affdon other ground, No. 04-57077, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11644 (9th Cir. June 14,
2005).
The United States has filed a notice of intent to intervene and it appears that the
constitutional issue will be reargued before the District Court.
3 Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
4 Soo id. at 353-60. But see Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1937)
(extending protection based on effort); Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone PubFg Co., 281 F.
83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922); Dunn v. Lumberman's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83, 84-85 (7th Cir. 1906), afd, 209
U.S. 20, 24 (1908); West Publ'g Co. v. Lawyers Coop. Publ'g Co., 79 F. 756, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1989);
Rural Tel. Co. v. Feist Publ'ns, 916 F.2d 718, 718 (10th Cir. 1990), revd, 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991).
5 Soo Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1871, 1880
(1990) (discussing Justice Holmes' opinion in the circus poster case, Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)).
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the statute to "original works of authorship" to encompass creative exercises, not the
mere industriousness of compilation.6
The Court ultimately adopted an "original" view of copyright, meaning that a
work must be original to the author and possess a minimum "spark" of creativity to
enjoy protection. 7 In a passage that has caused no end of heartburn to database
producers, the Supreme Court stated:
the copyright in a factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid
copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in
another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the
competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement ....
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be
8
used by others without compensation.
The Court did not intend the amount of originality necessary to qualify for copyright
protection to be particularly high, however, noting that most works would make the
grade quite easily. 9 It did, nonetheless, state that the originality requirement was
not "some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme," but "the essence of copyright"
and a "constitutional requirement."1 0
In the same breath, however, the Court went on to say that "sweat" works might
be protected under a theory of unfair competition. 1
The database industry has
consistently argued that legal and technological developments necessitated unfaircompetition based legislation, for the following reasons. First, the courts of appeal
have arrived at differing standards of "originality," some of them setting the
standard far higher than many expected after Feist.12 Second, other circuits have
developed a distinction between "hard" and "soft" facts: those facts that are
objectively verifiable, such as the temperature on a particular day, and those that
have been infused with the author's subjective editorial judgment, such as estimated
used car prices or coin prices in a given market, respectively. 13 Although proper
categorization of a fact as either "hard" or "soft" may be difficult, the courts do make
one thing clear: those databases that contain accurate, unsubjectively derived

6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (extending protection under title 17 only to an "originalworkof
authorship") (emphasis added). See generally Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 1888-93 (discussing the
historical development of the distinction between "high" and "low" authorship).

7Feist,499 U.S. at 363.
8 Id. at 349.
Id. at 359.
10Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
11 See id.at 354.
12See, e.g., Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1522 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Gobold, J. dissenting) ("Categories desired may be limited or dictated by their utility or by the
marketplace and hence involve no originality .. ");Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d
276, 282-85 (3d Cir. 2004) (permitting copying of a database of parts numbers); see also Schoolhouse
Inc. v. Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 730, 731 (8th Cir. 2002) (defendant's copying and posting of
approximately 74% of plaintiffs database of school information on its website did not infringe the
plaintiffs copyright in the selection and arrangement of its database).
13See CCC Info. Sys. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 1994)
(protecting used car valuations infused with editorial judgment); CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256,
1260 (9th Cir. 1999) (protecting coin prices guide on the same theory).
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information, such as drug contraindications, public records, case law decisions,
financial data, and a number of other industrious collections of information are
rarely protectable. 14 The database industry argued that without statutory protection
to guard the enormous investments in gathering, organizing, or maintaining these
collections from the consequences of easy digital copying, re-shuffling, and redistribution, the incentives to compile these products would dissipate and they would
deteriorate in quantity and quality.
The more intellectually honest skeptics of such legislation would concede at least
some shortcomings of current law, but would argue that no additional protection is
needed, as no market failure has occurred. They generally point to a number of
existing federal and state causes of action that a wronged database owner might use
to prevent copying, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"),15 statedefined trespass to chattels,1 6 misappropriation law (discussed below),17 and
contract.18
Of these, only two-misappropriation and contract-may directly
proscribe the copying of unoriginal material. Although courts have upheld contracts
formed over the internet and through conduct indicating acceptance of license terms,
contracts cannot bind the world. Moreover, the scope of state law misappropriation
has been limited by the preemptive force of § 301 of the Copyright Act, to those acts

14 See Warren, 115 F.3d at 1520; EPM Commc'ns, Inc. v. Notara, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4299 (LMM),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11533, *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2000) (denying preliminary injunction and
noting that comparison of a printed compilation and an electronic data base was difficult because
the "Sourcebook arrangement cannot be perceived in the database unless someone uses the
computer 'to rearrange the [database] material into the [Sourcebook] copyrightholder's
arrangement."') (citation omitted); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that neither the selection or the arrangement of the Mid America database was sufficiently
creative to qualify for copyright protection, and noting that the large "amount of time and effort
which Mid America invested in order to gather and report such information [was] irrelevant"
because "originality, and not industry, is the touchstone of copyright protection").
15 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. (2000). The CFAA
prohibits accessing a "protected computer," e.g., a computer engaged in interstate commerce,
without authorization and causing "damage" or "loss." See § 1030(e)(8) (defining "damage" as harm
to the system); § 1030(e)(11) (defining "loss" as "any reasonable cost to any victim ... or other
consequential damage incurred because of interruption of service" to a particular computer or
computer system). The statute does not apply to information obtained without permission, nor to
industrious works contained on CD-ROM or in printed form.
16See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(upholding injunction against "web crawler" that was systematically appropriating auction
information from eBay's web site on the basis that the aggregate affect of others could "pile on" and
crash the system). Trespass to chattels is of limited utility to a database provider for a few reasons.
First, only those activities that cause a risk of system collapse (i.e., actual damage to the defendant's
interest in its computer system) raise the specter of liability. See oBay, 100 F. Supp 2d at 1070-71;
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306-07 (Cal. 2003) (holding that Intel had no cause of action in
trespass to chattels where the offending emails only caused emotional harm to Intel employees, i.e.,
there was no injury to its computer system). Second, the tort is of no practical utility to a database
provider whose contents are updated periodically (as opposed to in real time), or to the numerous
providers who make material available on CD ROM or in printed volumes.
17 See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
18See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). "Shrink wrap licenses are

enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general ....
"
Id. at 1449. Further, the law governing copyright, particularly 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), does not preempt
and prevent enforcement of the license. Id. at 1453.
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of misappropriation only applying to "hot news." 19 Nonetheless, the skeptics of
database protection legislation believe that this level of protection is sufficient, and
that any legislation to correct the theoretical market failure should not be litigable by
20
the wronged database producer, but solely by the government.

The standard debate over the need for and scope of any controversial piece of
legislation as applied to the database issue resulted in several bills of varying
strength and, as time progressed, increasing complexity. 21 With the exception of H.R.
3531 (an exclusive rights bill), however, these bills adopted the same general test in
various forms. The elements of that test are: (1) that the plaintiff creates a database
through substantial investment; (2) that the defendant copies substantial portions of
that database; and (3) that the defendant's subsequent distribution causes some
amount of harm to the market for the plaintiffs product.2 2 Much negotiation ensued
over the quantum of harm necessary to trigger liability, the scope of defenses
available for nonprofit, educational, and so-called "transformative" uses, and the
23
treatment of so-called "sole source" databases.
Congress ultimately chose not to act-not an especially surprising position when
controversial legislation is involved. What has made the database discussion rather
exceptional is that opponents of the legislation took the position not only that
Congress should not enact such legislation, but also that it lacked any constitutional
power to do so. More specifically, they have argued that the Feist decision

constitutionally and preemptively bars Congress from enacting legislation that
prevents the copying of facts-either directly, through database legislation, or
indirectly, through statutes such as the CFAA or restrictions on the downstream use
of uncopyrightable material. 24 In their view, Feist reflects a national "information

19See, e.g., NBA, 105 F.3d at 851. At least one court has cast doubt on the viability of any
state-law misappropriation claims. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, 271 F. Supp. 2d 737,
755-56 (D. Md. 2003) (finding that 17 U.S.C § 301 preempts "hot news" claim under Maryland Law).
20 See, e.g., Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong.
§ 107(a) (1st Sess. 1999) (enforceable only by the FTC).
21 See Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th
Cong. (2nd Sess. 1996) (exclusive rights model); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R.
2652, 105th Cong. § 1201 (1st Sess. 1997) (misappropriation model); Collections of Information
Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402 (1st Sess. 1998) (misappropriation model); H.R. 1858
§ 102 (misappropriation model); Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R.
3261, 108th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2003) (misappropriation model).
22 See H.R. 3261 § 3(a); H.R. 354 § 1402; H.R. 2652 § 1201.
2:3See, e.g., J.H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, DatabaseProtection at the Crossroads."
Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 793, 817 (1999)
(expressing concern over the effect of a database protection law on scientific research). While
expressing grave concern over the future of scientific inquiry, see id., Reichman and Uhilir (and
criticisms like it) remain strangely silent on whether or to what extent access to current scientific
databases is currently subject to site license.
24 See Brief for Digital Future Coalition et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2004) (No. 00-9596), available at
http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/verio.html (arguing that in Registe-ncom v. Ve-rio, "the district court
effectively has ruled that the raw facts in a database may not be copied" and that this violates the
holding in Feist in that "no one may copyright facts or ideas"). The brief discusses the same CFAA
that database legislation opponents have stated sufficiently protects the industry from theft. See id.

§ 11.
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policy," spawned by the Copyright Clause itself, dictating that the distribution of
25
facts cannot be limited by any legal mechanism.
This argument has its origins in a body of academic literature that has
attempted to frame copyright policy disagreements as abuses of constitutional power,
and has been repeatedly proffered in various forms by a group of traveling amici in a
variety of different cases. 26 It is premised on the uncontroversial proposition that the
federal government has limited powers: those that are not delegated are reserved by
states or the people. 27 From this premise, it extrapolates to the also relatively
uncontroversial proposition that the Copyright Clause, 28 which gives Congress the
power to grant exclusive rights to authors in their writings for a limited time, serves
as both a grant and a limitation on Congressional power. Feist, in turn, has stated
that facts are not "writings," and that originality isa "constitutional requirement."
These groups have extended Feists limitation of Congress's power under the
Copyright Clause to support a novel and destructive position that the clause bars the
protection of unoriginal "non-writings" under another congressional power, such as
the ability to regulate interstate commerce-irrespective of whether that power
would otherwise grant Congress the requisite authority. This extraordinary position
was not only advanced by the opponents of database legislation, but also adopted by
29
some members of Congress that opposed the legislation.
Despite the overall abysmal track record of constitutional challenges to
copyright legislation,3 0 this rationale has been adopted by a U.S. district court. In
25 Brief for American Library Ass'n et. al, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *4, *20,
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 540 U.S. 806 (2003) (No. 02-428).
26 See, e.g., Br. of Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions et a] at 2 in
Register com v. Vero, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The Feist Court's frequent invocations of the
Constitution are not merely rhetorical flourishes; they implement a federal policy favoring free
access to facts.") (No.00-201); Brief for American Library Ass'n, supra note 25, at *9-10 (attacking
the legality of mass-market licenses that prohibit contracts that protect databases from
misappropriation because they undermine Feist's decision that facts should be freely available);
Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants at
2, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d. Cir. 2001), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/NY (attacking the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
Some have argued against enactment of database legislation. Soo gne-rally Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and
Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BEREKLEY TECH. L.J. 535, 546-48 (2000); Paul J.
Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The IntellectualProperty Clause
As an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1178-79; Malla Pollack, The
Right to Know? Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the
IntellectualPropeoty Clause and the FirstAmendment, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999).
27U.S. CONST. amend. X.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2$)See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-421, at 81-83 (2004) (dissenting views of Reps. Lofgren, Watt,
and Meehan); H.R. REP. NO. 105-525, at 28-31 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (dissenting views of Rep.
Lofgren).
30 There have been several unsuccessful-yet creative-constitutional challenges to copyright
legislation in the past three years. Typically, these challenges are based on two arguments: that the
legislation exceeded Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause, and that the statute violated
the First Amendment. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196 (2003) (challenging the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA")) United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1122
(D. Cal. 2002) (challenging the use restrictions capable of being placed on Adobe® eBooks); Luck's
Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2004) (challenging section 514
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA") implementing Article 18 of the Berne Convention

[5:78 2005]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property

United States v. Martignon,3 1 the Southern District of New York recently held the
federal criminal bootlegging statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, unconstitutional.32 That
statute prohibits the recording and distribution of recordings without the consent of
the performer; a provision that Mr. Martignon violated by running a record store that
trafficked in bootlegged sound recordings.
Martignon moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that enactment of
the statute was prohibited by the Copyright Clause.33 The district court agreed, and,
splitting with an Eleventh Circuit case on the same issue, 34 found that the statute
unconstitutionally applied "copyright-like" protection to unfixed and presumably
unoriginal "non-writings." 35 The court also found that section 2319A impermissibly
offered bootlegs perpetual protection, and therefore violated the requirement that
3 6
copyright laws must be for a "limited time"
Martignon created a three-pronged analysis that would apply to evaluating the
constitutionality of a database bill. First, the court must determine whether or not
the statute at issue is "copyright-like." 37 If it is, protection offered under that statute
must be for a "limited
time." 38 Second, any "copyright-like" protection cannot protect
"non-writings." 39 Third, if a "copyright-like" statute protects non-writings, Congress
may not use any other enumerated power to enact such a statute. 40 These defects, in
41
the view of the Southern District of New York, doomed the bootlegging law.

for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works that restores copyright to foreign copyright holders
whose works fell into the U.S. public domain but remain protected in their origin country); cl Golan
v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 (D. Colo. 2004) (dismissing term extension-based challenge
but permitting challenge to § 104A to go forward on Copyright Clause and First Amendment
grounds); Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. C-04-1127 MMC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24090, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 19, 2004) (challenging multiple federal copyright laws). One challenger unsuccessfully argued
that the Copyright Clause limited the ability of Congress to enact the anti-circumvention provisions
of DMCA under the Commerce Clause. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. The most creative
argument-thus far is that Congress's deletion of statutory formalities altered the "traditional
contours of copyright" for First Amendment purposes. Kahe, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24090, at *10.
'31 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Furthermore, a California district court, relying
heavily on the Martignon decision, subsequently struck down the civil analog to 18 U.S.C. § 2319A
(2000) (the bootlegging statute held unconstitutional in Martinon). Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int'l
Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2004), afd on other grounds, No. 04-57077, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11644 (9th Cir. June 14, 2005).
32 Section 2319A contains two prohibitions. Section (a)(1) prohibits unauthorized creating of
an audio or visual recording of a live musical performance without the consent of the performer.
Sections 2319(a)(2) and (a)(3) prohibit, respectively, the unauthorized transmission of that live
performance or trafficking in recordings thereof. Martignon was charged with a violation of section
(a)(3). See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (describing how Martignon ran a record store).
3 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17.
34 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Moghadam's
challenge of the constitutional power of Congress to enact the "anti-bootlegging statute," 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319A (2000)).
3, Compare Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24, with Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-74.
'36See Martignon,346 F. Supp. 2d at 429. The Eleventh Circuit did not address this point. See
Mog-hadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 n.9.
37 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20.
38 Id. at 424.
3) Id. at 423.
40 Id. at 424-29.
41 The court stated
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If the "Limited Times" requirement in the Copyright Clause applies to other
enactments, a term of protection must be included in database legislation-a term
that indeed has been included in every draft considered by Congress. Under the
district court's reasoning, databases, as "non-writings," could not be protected under
Congress's copyright power or commerce power. In other words, Congress's power
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 serves to limit its ability to act under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3.
This paper will briefly examine the merits of this contention. First, it will
discuss the scope of the Copyright Clause as it has been interpreted in other
litigation occurring in the copyright field. It will then briefly discuss whether this
position finds support in the history of the clause or the structure of the Constitution.
This paper will then examine the manner in which the Supreme Court has handled
related issues in the past, and why, in light of these authorities, the decision in
Martignon is not only wrong, but breathtakingly so. This paper will then conclude
with a few remarks about how these issues may ultimately be resolved.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY DISPUTES
Database legislation will not be passed pursuant to the Copyright Clause, but
pursuant to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Databases, and the
substantial investments needed to produce them, move in and affect interstate
commerce.
Indeed, the legislation's skeptics have not taken the position that
database legislation lacks the requisite relationship to interstate commerce. They
have adopted two variations of the same basic argument. The first states that the
Copyright Clause is a complete bar to database protection of any type, which would
mean that both of the bills recently passed by the House Commerce and Judiciary
Committees are unconstitutional. 42 The second position states that the only kind of
misappropriation statute that the Constitution permits is that outlined by
International News Service v. Associated Press43 and NBA v. Motorola,44 which
require that: (1) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (2) the
information is "highly" time-sensitive; (3) a defendant's use of the information
constitutes free-riding on the plaintiffs efforts; (4) the defendant is in direct
competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (5) the ability of
other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the
[iln order to give meaning to the express limitations provided in the
Copyright Clause, when enacting copyright-like legislation, such as the antibootlegging statute, whose purpose is "to promote the Progress of Science .... "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does not
allow for such legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of power, even
when that separate grant provides proper authority.
Martirnon,346 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25.
42 See Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261,
108th Cong.
§ 3(a) (ist Sess. 2003) (prohibiting "[a]ny person who makes available in commerce to others a
quantitatively substantial part of the information in a database generated, gathered, or maintained
by another person, knowing that such making available in commerce is without the authorization of
that person") (emphasis added).
43Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
44NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be
4
substantially threatened.
The most striking thing about this particular argument is that neither NBA nor
International News, on which misappropriation law is based, say anything
whatsoever about constitutional bars to misappropriation laws. In International
News, the dissents focused on whether the court, using its then-existing federal
common law powers, should enjoin International News's activity in the absence of a
federal statute. 46 Similarly, NBA is not a "constitutional" decision except to the
extent that it preempts state law through the Supremacy Clause. 47 In that case, the
Second Circuit applied the statutory preemption provision of the Copyright Act
against New York's state-law misappropriation doctrine to determine whether, and
to what extent, the state law survived the "extra element test."4 8 Neither case
intimates that the Copyright Clause limits legislative power to enact a
49
misappropriation statute, or that these cases formed the outer limits of that power.
So where does this point of view come from? Is this the ordinary way that
clauses of the Constitution operate? How has the Supreme Court handled these
issues in the past?

A. Textual Grants of OverlappingPowers:Does Post Roads Mean No Other Roads?
Congress's Article I powers under
Federalist papers make clear that,
Necessary and Proper clause in the
adopting a destructive, lex speeiali6 0

the Constitution are intended to overlap. The
for example, the reason for including the
Constitution was to prevent the states from
interpretation of Federal power under Article

4" NBA, 105 F.3d at 845. (stating the requirements for a "hot-news," International News
Service-like claim).
46 See Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Courts are ill-equipped to
make the investigations which should precede a determination of the limitations which should be set
upon any property right in news or of the circumstances under which news gathered by a private
agency should be deemed affected with a public interest.").
41 See NBA, 105 F.3d at 848-53 (discussing statutory preemption under the copyright act).
48 See id.
49 Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, a number of states provided
misappropriation protection under their own laws. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Dow Jones &
Co., 439 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1st Dist. Ill. 1982), af,-d, 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). But see U.S. Trotting
Ass'n v. Chi. Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1984) (involving the defendant racetrack's use
of horse registration information without compensation to the compiler); Addison Wesley Publ'g Co.
v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678, 678-79 (E.D.N.Y 1962) (enjoining defendant's publication of solutions to
problems in plaintiffs textbook after showing that colleges would cease to purchase the textbook if
the solutions were not withdrawn from the market); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24
F. Supp. 490, 493-94 (D. Pa. 1938) (finding that defendant's rooftop viewing and simultaneous playby-play broadcast of baseball games unlawfully interfered with an exclusive contract to broadcast
those games). See generally 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 10:51 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the elements of misappropriation as: (1) substantial
investment in the thing misappropriated; (2) act of the defendant constituting a "free ride;" and (3)
injury to the plaintiff).
50 The maxim, lex specials derogat lex gene±ralisis better known as the canon that the "specific
controls the general."
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This intent is fairly obvious from its structure-the power to create post roads 52
does not mean, for example, that Congress may only create post roads and no others.
Similarly, the power to punish felonies on the high seas 53 does not mean that
Congress lacks the power to create misdemeanors on interstate waterways.
Comparison of the affirmative grants in Article I, Section 8 with the limitations
on Congressional power contained in Article I, Section 9 reinforces this structural
point. While the powers in Section 8 are phrased in terms of affirmative grants,
Section 9 instructs Congress about the specific activities forbidden to it, such as the
enactment of bills of attainder, the granting of titles of nobility, or the laying of
duties on the exports of any State. 54 The textual structure of Section 8 versus Section
9 seems to foreclose the existence of a "dormant Copyright Clause" that operates to
55
the detriment of other Article I, Section 8 powers.
Nonetheless, there is a substantial body of academic literature that argues that
the Founders had an overwhelming concern with "monopolies" in Britain, and that
these historical concerns enable the Copyright clause to constrain exercise of
Congress's other powers. 56
In the author's view, these commentators have
misconstrued the nature of the Founders' objections to the Crown's grant of
monopolies in Britain by confusing a relatively minor economic evil with a major
structural one. In the mid to late sixteenth century, the Crown and Parliament were
at odds with each other over a variety of issues. 57 The monopoly over playing cards
and the stationers' monopolies served to take the power of the purse away from the
House of Commons and place it in the hands of the executive, removing one of the
key legislative checks on executive power. 58 When designing the structure of the
Constitution, the Founders placed the power to grant these monopolies in the hands
1.51

F1See THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://www.law.ou.edu/
hist/federalist/.
But SUSPICION may ask, why then was it [the N & P clause] introduced?
The answer is that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard
against all caviling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to
curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. The Convention
probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate,
that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is that the State
governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and might therefore
think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction.
Id.
52 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
53See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
E.g, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, 5.
55, Even where Congress has explicit power to act under the Commerce Clause, yet does not,
that power lies "dormant" and can be exerted to strike down state legislation that would be enacted
in contravention to Congress's grant. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1984)
(denoting the origination of a "dormant" power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several
states).
56 E.g., Edward S. Irons and Mary Helen Sears, The ConstitutionalStandard of Invention-The Touchstone for PatentReform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653, 667-78 (1973).
57 See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Symposium: Art and the Marketplace of Expression, 17 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 169-171 (2003) (describing the evils wrought by the Crown's censorship of
works).
5S See id.
54
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of the legislature, rendering this provision uncontroversial. 59 This analysis of events
seems to explain why the Federalist Papers contain no mention of any external
operation of the Copyright Clause, and why no record of any discussion of the clause
60
during the federal convention exists.

B. JudicialTreatment of OverlappingPowersin Non-IntellectualProperty Contexts
There are of course cases in which the Court has read certain implicit structural
limits into the Constitution, such as when it found that the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution goes well beyond its literal text and constrains other exercises of
Congress's Article I power. 61 The resolution of this type of case involves issues at the
very heart of the federal structure, and the history of judicial treatment of the
Eleventh Amendment demonstrates that, in each case, the Court must resolve a
question of the states' sovereignty at the expense of the federal government, or viceversa. 62 The imposition of our external Copyright Clause, in contrast, pits the
Congress against itself for the benefit of the "the public"-hardly the "discrete and
insular minority" whose interests warrant special judicial protection. 63 The interplay
between major structural interests (federalism, individual rights, separation of
powers) that serves as the hallmark of constitutional litigation seems to be utterly
lacking.
Judicial treatment of Article I powers confirms that the courts do not ordinarily
set the legislature against itself. Outside the intellectual property arena, the history
of treating the powers of Congress as overlapping is a robust one, starting with the
instructions given in McCullough v. Marylandthat "any means adapted to the end,
any means which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the
64
government, were in themselves constitutional."
59Id. (arguing that the stationers' monopoly created concern in the Founders over the exercise
of private control); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
60See Thomas Nachbar, IntellectualProperty and ConstitutionalNorms, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
272, 338 (2004) (surveying the ratification debates and finding no controversy over the Copyright
Clause). Indeed, in the only Federalist Paper to discuss the Copyright Clause, Madison wrote that
"The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. ... The public good fully coincides in both
cases, with the claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). It contains no
discussion of either (a) the evils of a legislatively granted intellectual property right, or (b) a
suggestion that the clause limits the interstate commerce (or any other) article I power.
61See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that states are immune from private
suit for damages under federal law even in their own courts); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity bars
federal court jurisdiction of suits against states for damages); see also Bd.of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000) (disability suits against states barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
62 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 751 (discussing "splitting the atom of sovereignty").
63 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
614
McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 419 (1819). MeCullough does suggest that legislation
passed under certain powers is a "pretext" for accomplishing feats not within their powers. See id.
at 423. Some commentators have argued that past efforts at database legislation constitute mere
'pretext" for granting a copyright in facts and would therefore be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Marci
Hamilton, Symposium: A Response to ProfessorBenkler, 15 BEREKLEY TECH. L.J. 622-23 (2000);
Benkler, supra note 26, at 546-48. But the only vehicle that espoused an exclusive rights approach,
Sections 1402 and 1403 of H.R. 354, supra note 21, for example, required the plaintiff to prove
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Several prominent examples of Congress using its Article I powers in
overlapping fashion exist. For example, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases found
that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be used to support anti-discrimination
legislation directed at private parties. 65 There, the Court invalidated Congressional
attempts to prohibit discrimination in private affairs using the Fourteenth
Amendment as the source of legislative power because the Fourteenth Amendment's
text applies only to the states. 66 In 1964, however, the Court in the Heart ofAtlanta
case upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of the
Commerce Clause power, 67 and since then, all subsequent civil rights laws have been
based on the Commerce Clause. 68 The CivilRights Cases, however, remain good law.
There is one additional line of cases which could be read to support the position
in Martignon. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, well before Wiekard
expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause to reach purely intrastate activity, 69 the
Court considered a number of tax cases that juxtaposed Congress's ability to tax local
activity 7 against the scope of the commerce power. The lack of express federal power
did not indicate any lack of Congressional desire to regulate purely local affairs, from
futures contracts to child labor. 71 In this line of cases, Congress sought to discourage
certain kinds of behavior through the use of its taxing power, and the Court was
ultimately forced to determine whether those cases were properly "taxes" or attempts
72
to enact intrastate economic regulation in disguise.
These cases, which did define the relationship between the two separate Article
I powers of taxation and interstate commerce, do not support the proposition that
these powers limit each other. The Court struck down certain kinds of legislation on
the grounds that the legislation was not in fact a "tax,' 73 but to the extent that the
"material harm" to its "primary or related" market, and then permitted the defense to excuse that
harm if the use was nonetheless "reasonable." These (and other) provisions of the legislation
rendered it distinguishable from a "pretextual" copyright regime, and much more like, for example,
the regional railroad insolvency plan considered (and approved) in the 3R Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 15961 (1974). See id. (rejecting "Uniformity" challenge to regional railroad bankruptcy rules).
65 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
66 Id. at 18.
67 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964).
68 E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (holding that the Court "must
conclude that [Congress] had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants
had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce").
69 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause reaches
purely local activity if, in the aggregate, that local activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ... .
71See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36-38, 44 (1922) (striking down "tax" as
impermissible local regulation); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (regulation of futures trading);
McRay v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63-64 (1904) (upholding tax on oleomargarine designed to
curtail its production).
72 See Hi/l, 259 U.S. at 66-67 (invalidating tax statute because in addition to collecting
revenue, it also proscribed false and misleading reports, prevented price manipulation by cornering
the market, and set the rules for admission to certain boards); Child Labor, 259 U.S. at 38 (striking
down excise tax on any person that employed child labor).
73 See Hill,259 U.S. at 66 (finding "the manifest purpose of the tax is to compel boards of trade
to comply with [federal] regulations"); CildLabor,250 U.S. at 38 ("To give such magic to the word
'tax' would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely
wipe out the sovereignty of the states.").
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Court discussed the Commerce Clause at all, it is only to mention that it could not
uphold the tax statute because the requisite jurisdictional requirements for a valid
commerce statute had not been met; without that commerce nexus, upholding the
statute would tread on areas of sovereignty reserved to the States.7 4 Conversely, had
the requisite Commerce Clause pre-requisites been present, there is no suggestion in
these authorities that the Commerce Clause lacked power to regulate this conduct.

C. The Court's Treatment of IntellectualProperty
The Court's treatment of intellectual property statutes squares with its
treatment of other article I powers. Although a fair amount of academic writings
exist discussing the scope of the Copyright Clause and its purported limits on other
Congressional power, very little case law authority supports this point of view, or, to
put it more neutrally, it is a "question of first impression." The use of the Commerce
Clause to fill gaps in other powers has occurred in several cases involving intellectual
property.
Nearly a century after the constitutional convention, the Supreme Court decided
the Trade Mark Cases, in which the Court found that the Copyright Clause did not
support the enactment of trademark legislation.7 5 Like the white page listings at
issue in Feista century later, the Court found that the trademarks did not meet the
standard of "original writings" for purposes of the Copyright Clause.7 6 The Court did,
however, note that Congress might pass a valid trademark statute under the
Commerce Clause, but the statute gave no indication of any intent to regulate
interstate commerce.77 Subsequently, all federal trademark laws have been enacted
under the Commerce Clause.7 8 The fact that in 1870 the Court found that such laws
were impermissible under the Copyright Clause has not been viewed as limiting
79
Congress' authority to protect trademarks under the Commerce Clause.
The most recent of these cases is Eldred v Asbheroft.8 0 In that case, Eric Eldred
et a]. brought a declaratory suit against the attorney general arguing that Congress,
by extending the term of copyright to life plus seventy years, violated the "Limited
Times" phrase of the Copyright Clause.8 1 They argued that the Copyright Clause
was "special," and that a fear of monopoly in its drafters mandated heightened
judicial review of any copyright statute via the First Amendment and under the
74 See Hill, 259 U.S. at 68-69 (stating that the statute could not be sustained under the
commerce power and that Congress had no intention of regulating interstate commerce and had not
limited the statute to interstate commerce; the alternative holding would usurp state sovereignty);

Child Labor, 259 U.S. at 39.
75 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
76 See id. Trademarks, of course, last for an unlimited time so long as they remain in use and
retain their ability to identify the source of goods or services. Chrinstine Nickles, The ConMiets

Between Intellectual Property Protoetions When a CharacterEnters the Public Domain, 7 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 133, 155 (1999).
77Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97.
78 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
7' Id.; see also Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the
now defunct manufacturing requirements under 17 U.S.C. § 601 on Commerce Clause grounds).
80537 U.S. 186 (2003).
81 See id.
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Copyright Clause itself.8 2 In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court put that argument to
rest, finding "that the [act extending the Copyright term] is a rational enactment; we
are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments
"83

In addition the Court interpreted the "writings" requirement in Feist by
rejecting the argument that extending the term of protection to works already in
copyright violates the clause's Writings requirement.8 4 It also rejected attempted
analogies to cases in the patent context, noting that prior statements that the
Copyright Clause is both a "grant and a limitation" did not establish any special
"quid pro qud' test that must apply to a statute enacted under the Copyright
Clause.8 5 From a First Amendment standpoint, in what some have characterized as
Eldreds silver lining, the Court went on to say that where Congress alters the
traditional contours of copyright protection, such as by removing fair use, some
8 6
additional First Amendment scrutiny might be warranted.
The deference with which the Court treated congressional judgment in the
Eldred decision suggests that there is nothing particularly unique about Congress's
copyright power, at least when enacting "traditional" copyright statutes. The
decision does not, however, address the limits of the power as applied against other
clauses of the Constitution. Although there is some suggestion that Congress may
not enact perpetual copyright laws because of the "Limited Times" limitation,87 no
case suggests that the Copyright Clause's "Writing" limitation would facially
invalidate a database statute (though the First Amendment has been used on one
occasion not relevant here).88
82 See

Brief of Petitioner, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at

http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf.
83 Edred,537 U.S. at 208.
81 See id. at 211.
85 Id. at 202 n.7, 215-16 (rejecting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 15
(1966), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 14 (1989) as evidence of "quid pro quo" theory of copyright).
86 See id. at 221. This so-called light at the end of the tunnel may well turn out to be the
headlamp of an oncoming train. In Kahle v.Asheroft,No. C-04-1127 MMC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24090, at *9-11, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004), the District Court for the Northern District of California
rejected the argument that the abolition of formalities in the 1976 Act changed the "fundamental
contours" of copyright. The case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
87See Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) ("To hold [that the
trademark law as a statutory matter addressed works whose copyright had lapsed] would be akin to
finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not
do."); Traffix Devices v. Marketing Displays, 523 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (petitioner and its amici
argue that the Patent Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of its own force,
prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress
protection. We need not resolve this question. If, despite the rule that functional
features may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which
trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will
be time enough to consider the matter.
(internal citation omitted).
8 See United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152, 1164-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress cannot enact a private copyright statute to ensure that Christian
Scientists enjoy doctrinal purity). The copyright act has also been invalidated on an "as applied"
basis with respect to laws enacted by a local legislature. See genorally Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Int'l,
Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (invalidating copyright protection in laws adopted by municipality
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The entire basis of this theory is based on one slender reed, Railway Labor
Executives Association v. Gibbons. 89 In that case, Congress created a financial safety
net for the workers of a bankrupt railroad, and upset the payment of debts in the
priority that the bankruptcy trustee had determined. 90 In the statute, Congress
referred to the bankrupt Rock Island railroad specifically; the statutory requirement
would not apply to any other entity or class of entities. 91 The Court found, however,
that Congress's action violated the Bankruptcy Clause's requirement that
bankruptcy laws be uniform, and that it could not enact such a statute under the
Commerce Clause.9 2 It would be truly odd if the Gibbons decision were interpreted to
mean that bankruptcy laws relating to insolvency could not be enacted under any
other power or that only the states could enact non-uniform Bankruptcy Acts.
Nonetheless, the Southern District of New York seems to have gone directly down
that road.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARTIGNON
In Martignon, the Southern District of New York disregarded this string of
precedent and applied Gibbons to find the federal bootlegging statute
unconstitutional for two reasons, and differed with an Eleventh Circuit case on the
exact same issue. 93 First, as noted above, the court found that unfixed performances
were not "writings" within the meaning of the Copyright Clause.9 4 It then
determined that because they were not "writings," and the bootleg statute prohibited
distribution without authorization, the statute was "copyright-like" and
unconstitutional. 95 The court also found the statute unconstitutional because its
96
protection potentially lasted for an unlimited time.
The opinion gives no guidance as to what makes a statute "copyright-like," and
therefore unconstitutional if it governs things that are unfixed. 97 Because consent by
the performer is an element of the prime facie case under 2319A, if the performer
authorizes taping of the performance, then he can claim no rights under the
bootlegging provision; copies may be traded freely (subject to any other claims that

on due process grounds). I do not mean to suggest that either 18 U.S.C. § 2319A or any potential
database statute might not face "as applied" challenges on First Amendment grounds; they certainly
may, and those challenges may in some circumstances be successful. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514 (2001) (holding application of wiretap statute to radio station unconstitutional under the
First Amendment).
89 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
90 See id. at 463-65.

91See id. at 471.
92 See id. at 472.
93 Compare United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), with
United States v. Mogadham, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).
94 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24.
9 Id. at 425.
96 See id. at 424.
97 See id. Presumably, a copyright statute under Article I, § 8 cl. 8 must have the following
elements (a) an author; (b) a writing; (c) an exclusive right; and (d) a limited duration. The court's
decision did not compare 18 U.S.C. § 2319A to the Clause's requirements.
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might exist).98 The federal wiretap statute is structured in a similar fashion. 99 Even
more strikingly, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 creates criminal liability for any
person who "without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs,
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers,
sends, mails, communicates, or conveys" a trade secret without permission. 100
Congress intended this provision to apply irrespective of whether the trade secret is
original or within its copyright term. 10 1 The copyright term runs, however, whether
the work is unpublished or not. 10 2 Finally, the federal trademark dilution act
10 3
prohibits blurring and tarnishment of a famous mark (a non-writing) in perpetuity.
If Martignon is correct, the dilution statute, as well as others, are constitutionally
vulnerable because they all protect "non-writings" for an unlimited time. 10 4 As it
stands now, the Martignon decision raises questions about a whole variety of
legislation, both existing and prospective.
Perhaps the strangest effect of that decision is that its necessary implication is
that, no matter what the interstate or foreign commerce nexus, the states are the
only entities in the federal system with the ability to protect bootlegs and,
presumably, databases.1 05 In the context of the bootlegging statute, in Martignonthe
fact that the bootlegging statute was part of accession to the World Trade
Organization made no constitutional difference. 10 6 Similarly, database legislation is
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(1), (3) (2000).
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2000) (prohibiting knowing disclosure of wire intercept, no matter
how old).
100 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (2000).
101 S. REP. No. 104-359, at 14 (1996) ("[It is intended that the provisions of the Act should
apply regardless of whether the conduct at issue could also fall within the prohibitions of the
copyright laws.").
102 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (denoting that a copyright in a work "subsists from its croation")
(emphasis added).
103 Moseley v. V Secret Catalog, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-34 (2003).
104 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (prohibiting the unauthorized access of information on a
protected computer, irrespective of the information's originality or its age).
1051
Prior to the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, the bootlegging of sound recordings was
handled entirely by state law. Those recordings were protected by the states irrespective of their
"originality."
106 There is certainly a strong reason to believe that it should make a difference, and not only
based on the commerce power. The federal government may regulate matters through treaties that
might be otherwise foreclosed to it by Article I. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). In
Holland,the Court found that Congress could, via the treaty power of Article 11, extend protection to
subject matter outside the limits of the Commerce Clause under Article I. Id. Some thirty-seven
years later, the Court limited Hollands scope when it refused to construe Article IV to allow the
government-by treaty-to deny citizens their constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
Section 2319A was enacted pursuant to the Uruguay Round, and some dispute exists as to
whether the "majority" process of acceding to the URAA via executive-congressional agreement
made the legislation a treaty. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 18.06 (C)(3)(b) (2005). Such cases, however, may well not be justiciable. See id.
§ 18.06 (C)(3)(b), n.298 (citing Tribe testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation). The Restatement of Foreign Relations indicates that the URAA carries the full
force of a treaty under Article VI of the Constitution. 3d RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 303 cmt. E (1986) (finding that Congressional-Executive Agreement is a full substitute for a
treaty). It would therefore appear that a court could sustain § 2319A on this ground. As it does not
violate any express constitutional prohibition, the "injury" wrought by § 2319A seems to fall much
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motivated, in part, by the reciprocity requirements in the EU Directive. Given the
importance of intellectual property to the both domestic and foreign commerce, such
a result would be both unfortunate and bizarre.
I am therefore cautiously optimistic that Martignon will be reversed in
significant portion, if not in its entirety. In the short term, Martignon's effect on
database legislation remains hypothetical, but not positive. In the long term,
however, resolution of the issues presented in this decision will set the parameters of
Congress's power to regulate not only bootlegging, but databases and other
"unoriginal" intangible property.

closer to the regulation permitted by Hollandand far short of that prohibited by Reid. I suspect that
sustaining § 2319A on a treaty theory, however, would offer cold comfort to the database industry,
as the prospects for an international vehicle remain considerably dimmer than that for domestic
legislation.

